Soviet-era tank design, starting with the T-64 and continuing with the T-72, T-80 and T-90 families – albeit with some minor differences – introduced an automatic ammunition handling system which sits beneath the turret of the tank. To recreate the war in the Ukraine would require MBT players to make decisions that they might not be inclined to make. Some are here, like Grade or Morale or even Tank Fright, but at the end of the day the real human factor in MBT is the players. While MBT has a good detailed model of platform versus platform, what it doesn’t capture very well are all the human factors in battle. RMN Boys at the Tank Farm in 2019…T-72 height to top of cupola is 7’4″ (2.2m) The last point does not directly appear to be modeled, but may play a part in overall determination of Force Grade and Morale. The first two factors are generally reflected in MBT as stabilization and sights are taken into account in the combat model. Russian designs are also very cramped, and few Western tank operators would want to operate a main battle tank with a crew of three – which is standard for all Soviet designs from the T-64 onwards. The sights and fire control computers are generally less modern than their peers. While stabilisation of the main armament has been improved and its recoil mechanisms balanced to reduce impact upon the vehicle during firing, most Russian tanks appear to lack the quality of stabilisation that most Western tanks carry.Ī second element of this problem is the mission system fit of Russian tanks. While MBT has many of the rules that can be used to simulate the new war we see today, what it doesn’t simulate is the poor decisions in the Russian operational art of this war. From the past two months of fighting in the Ukraine, the reformed Russian Army, though equipped with more modern equipment, appears to have lost the ability to execute combined arms operations. Air-Land Battle Doctrine and the competing Soviet Army of that day. In many ways MBT is built around the U.S. The game-again by design-is optimized to simulate those massed Soviet thrusts or defensive stands.
MBT is-by design-a wargame that recreates the (past potential) battlefields of Europe at the height of the Cold War. Playing a game of MBT with its precise hit locations and penetration versus armor model is what the hardcore Grognard in me loves.įor the massed head-on engagements that they were designed for, and especially in defensive positions, Russian tanks are capable and effective vehicles – providing that they are properly operated. The ‘ cheeks’ of the cast turret are hollow, allowing additional advanced armours to be inserted that significantly extend protection against some types of threat. The turret armour on Russian tanks is also relatively capable to the front of the tank. The angle of the armour – 68 degrees – increases its line-of-sight thickness to 547 mm for some of the earliest T-72 designs – it may be more for others. The frontal armour of the slope at the front of the hull, known as the glacis, typically combines high hardness steels with composites or materials like fibre glass that are known to be challenging for weapons like the RPG-7. Most of Russia’s tanks are well protected to the front. Playing MBT helps to see these lessons on the gaming table in front of us. In the article they tell us the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly on lessons learned for armored combat in the Ukraine.
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Sam Cranny-Evans and Dr Sidharth Kaushal from the Royal United Services Institute () looked at this thinking in a recent article titled, “Technical Reflections on Russia’s Armoured Fighting Vehicles” (April 27, 2022). One very common theme we hear from pundits and mainstream media is a constant harping that the Ukrainian use of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) has sealed the fate of armored vehicles on the battlefield.
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